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Categorical Shortcomings: 
Application, Adjudication, and 
Contextual Descriptions of Game Rules 
Chad Carlson and John Gleaves 
In the final extra time minutes of the 20 I 0 World Cup quarterfinal match between 
Uruguay and Ghana, Uruguay's star striker Luis Suarez deliberately batted the 
ball with his hand off of his own team's goal line. The referee quickly detected 
his action, penalizing Suarez with a red card for deliberately handling the ball and 
rewarding Ghana with a penalty kick. Given that he had no other way to stop the 
ball and with only seconds remaining, his decision appeared-despite the odds-to 
be a calculated one. Had Suarez not stopped the ball, Uruguay's World Cup run was 
over. Even with the impending penalty kick, Uruguay's chances of winning were 
slim but not impossible. Yet when Ghana's Asamoah Gyan failed to convert the 
subsequent penalty kick, Suarez's "deal with the devil" turned into either an act of 
strategic brilliance or the mischievous manipulation of a loophole in soccer rules. 
Suarez's actions raise questions about games and their rules. He openly vio-
lated the rules and willingly accepted his punishment, yet he also broke the rules 
in order to deny Ghana a fair and earned victory. So his case indicates a larger 
problem-what to make of this type of egregious but strategic rule breaking. To 
better understand the appropriateness of Suarez's actions, one needs to understand 
the more fundamental relationship between games and their rules. And it is here 
that, despite much effort, the field of sport philosophy is still without a satisfactory 
paradigm that explains game rules. 
The existing paradigm focuses mainly on a categorical distinction developed 
by John Searle between constitutive rules that make the convention possible by 
determining relationships where none existed before, and regulative rules that 
identify relevant existing relationships and regulate behavior. This constitutive/ 
regulative categorical distinction has a number of clear uses. It can help us under-
stand the need for rules to define practices like sports. It also indicates that some 
connection exists between sports and potentially incompatible rule violations. But 
it still remains unclear whether the constitutive/regulative distinction adequately 
provides a rough account of game rules or even if it sufficiently explains the rela-
tionship between games and their rules. More importantly, can such an account of 
game rules actually help us to evaluate a player's behavior in relation to a game's 
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198 Carlson and Gleaves 
rules? Can we apply an understanding of game rules predicated on constitutive 
and regulative categories to make sense of ambiguous situations such as Suarez's 
actions and his subsequent penalization? 
Our goal in this paper is not to make ethical arguments regarding Suarez's 
case. Rather we are proposing a new way of looking at game rules that will have 
implications for how we understand complex sporting situations. Broadly, how we 
understand game rules affects not just the metaphysics of games but also how we 
conceive of ethical behavior in sport (such as when evaluating Suarez's actions), 
the role of officials in adjudicating decisions, the nature of sport in society, and the 
value of sport in physical education. For example, we hope to show that the problem 
posed by Russell's question "are the rules all an umpire has to work with?" becomes 
less troublesome when we study rules from a different context than that which the 
existing literature provides (9). To examine these questions, we will briefly present 
Searle's original categorical distinction. Next, we will argue that scholars have thus 
far reached little consensus regarding the nature of constitutive and regulative rules. 
We show that, in the existing literature, the categorical distinction is not as neat as 
scholars have thus far suggested and that, perhaps, a more fundamental problem in 
this approach may lurk under the surface. We conclude that, though something can 
be made of the constitutive/regulative distinction of rules in sports, the distinction 
often blurs, leaving us with a continuum of rules-some more constitutive than 
others, some close and some far from the core features of the games that they define. 
Given this critique of the constitutive/regulative distinction in the sport philosophy 
literature, we conclude that this categorical paradigm for describing game rules 
cannot satisfactorily help philosophers of sport resolve many of the complex issues 
involving the application, interpretation, adjudication, or manipulation of a game's 
rules. In that way, we propose a new paradigm for evaluating actions-like Suarez's 
handball-that do not conform to strict categorical distinctions. 
Discussion of Pertinent Rules Literature 
Rules are the building blocks of games. Philosophical inquiry into rules potentially 
offers significant insights regarding new or developing game problems. Hereto-
fore, scholars have primarily sought to explain game rules through a Searlean 
constitutive/regulative distinction. While there is no evidence that some of the key 
contributions to the sport philosophy discussions of rule categorization owe any 
debt to Searle-even Searle admittedly transferred Kant's constitutive/regulative 
distinction to rules in a 1964 article and subsequent book chapter-most authors 
cite Searle's work prominently and all of them use at least some of the same ter-
minology.' Searle's work often cited game rules to explain the operation of rules 
in language. Philosophers of sport, perhaps noting the acuity of Searle's game 
examples, began using Searle's distinction between constitutive and regulative rules, 
or at least this Kantian language, to describe the actual operation of rules within 
games (I 0). Scholars such as Bernard Suits, Fred D' Agostino, Gordon Reddiford, 
Klaus Meier, William Morgan, Cesar Torres, and R. Scott Kretchmar incorporated 
Searle's terminology into their sport analyses.2 
The degree that sport philosophers use Searle's language shows the method's 
influence on how we understand rules in sport. Bernard Suits used similar language 
to describe games in his seminal metaphysical work while sport ethicists such as 
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Categorical Shortcomings 199 
Sigmund Loland and Robert Simon used the categorical/regulative distinction to 
explain sport ethics that resulted in the philosophies of essentialism, conventional-
ism, and broad internalizm (4,12,13). Furthermore, Graham McFee used Searle's 
categories, albeit critically, at the beginning of his epistemological and axiological 
analysis of rule following (5). Certainly sport philosophers found in Kant and Searle 
an approach to studying rules that has inspired a great deal of thinking. 
Ultimately, Searle's contribution to game rule literature hinges on the constitu-
tive/regulative distinction. He explains that languages have constitutive rules that 
"create or define new forms of behavior, and ... have the form: X counts as Y in 
context C" (II: p. 35). For Searle, these newly created forms of behavior include 
sets of circumstances that would direct game players to avoid committing a hand-
ball penalty, pursue checkmate in chess, or score a goal in soccer. Such forms of 
behavior would be unintelligible outside the context of a particular game's set of 
constitutive rules. Moreover, Searle explains that "constitutive rules constitute (and 
also regulate) an activity whose existence is logically dependent on the rules" (II: 
p. 34 ). Thus constitutive rules are only intelligible within the conventions of games 
while the games become intelligible through their constitutive rules. 
Searle's regulative rules, on the other hand, "regulate antecedently or indepen-
dently existing forms of behavior" (in the forms: "Do X"; or, "IfY do X"). These 
rules "regulate a pre-existing activity whose existence is logically independent 
of the rules" (II: p. 34 ). As such, they differ from constitutive rules. They do not 
create or define new behavior only understood within the context of the game like 
constitutive rules. Instead, they support constitutive rules by explaining behaviors 
that aid in successful occurrences of the games. That is, when behavior accords 
with a regulative rule, the behavior can be given the same description or specifica-
tion with or without using any particular rule. Regulative rules in games specify 
strategies (add defenders when winning late in a game), techniques (keep one's 
knee over the ball when shooting on goal), procedures (shake hands with opponents 
before and after games), and natural facts (a ball kicked with spin will curve away 
from the side on which it was struck). 
Bernard Suits published his first discussions of games and their rules around 
the same time as Searle. Suits explains that there are two kinds of rules: constitu-
tive rules and rules of skill. He defines constitutive game rules similar to Searle by 
implicitly claiming that they create new forms of behavior. Constitutive rules, to 
Suits, "prohibit use of the most efficient means for reaching a ... goal" and they 
"set out all the conditions which must be met in playing the game" ( 13: p. 37). Suits 
then makes a parenthetical caveat to his constitutive rules, explaining that there is 
also a subset of rules that are extensions of constitutive rules. He argues that the 
breaking of these rules is strategic in nature and carries with them fixed penalties, 
such as the intentional foul in basketball or Suarez's handball in soccer (13). 
Suits' second category, rules of skill, explains how to play the game well. Rules 
of skill lack coercive force in that a failure to comply with them is simply a failure 
to play the game well (kick with the laces to shoot a soccer ball, for example). 
Although not necessarily written into rule books, rules of skill influence how play-
ers play the game (13). Searle included these rules in his regulative category-a 
grouping that Suits does not address or at least downplays. 
Following Suits, D' Agostino marked the next significant shift in rules literature 
(I). D' Agostino uses the Searlean constitutive/regulative distinction to show the 
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200 Carlson and Gleaves 
indefensibility of formalistic accounts of games. That is, he explains that formalism 
with a rigid dichotomy between constitutive and regulative rules has indefensible 
"Platonistic implications" (I: p. 45). However, he understands constitutive and 
regulative rules differently than Searle and Suits by saying that the former define 
the game and the latter are penalty-invoking rules. With this new understanding, 
D' Agostino suggests a different account of game rules. Instead of formalism, which 
distinguishes only between permissible and not permissible behavior (what he 
refers to as the regimented or dichotomized categories of constitutive and regulative 
rules), he suggests that a conventionalist approach might be more defensible. In this 
ethos-oriented approach, D' Agostino does not explicitly use Searle's constitutive/ 
regulative terminology as he describes three categories of game behaviors as those 
which are permissible, impermissible but acceptable, and unacceptable. Further, he 
acknowledges that there is an "implicit set of conventions" in each sport that helps 
to distinguish between each of the three categories (I: p. 46). 
Reddiford conjures up the next attempt to clarify categories of game rules (8). 
He argues for an altogether different relationship than Searle, Suits, and D' Agostino 
regarding constitutive and regulative rules. For Reddiford, the constitutive and 
regulative distinction is not central to understanding games. Instead, he offers a 
different description of constitutive rules. Rather than creating or defining new 
forms of behaviors in games, they "create the possibility of new descriptions of 
behavior" (8: p. 44). Playing codified games of soccer does not create new behaviors 
so much as give new meaning to presoccer behavior (frivolously kicking a ball), 
a type of activity that is still a part of the institution, or overall culture, of soccer. 
After Reddiford, Meier goes in a different direction than previous authors 
regarding constitutive/regulative distinctions. Meier proclaims that "it is by no 
means clear that an absolute dichotomization [between constitutive and regula-
tive rules] may be supported" (6: p. 69). Instead, he believes, unlike Reddiford or 
D' Agostino, that "[regulative] rules are perhaps best viewed as extensions, or as 
a subset of constitutive rules rather than as indicators of the termination, however 
temporary, of the 'constitutional internalities' of playing the game" (6: p. 69). Suits 
also referred to a subset of constitutive rules, but he did not label this smaller group. 
According to Meier, both constitutive (try to score goals) and regulative rules 
(but do not use your hands when doing so) are instantiated "during the occurrence 
of the game" (6: p. 70), and can be explained together within the game. However, 
Meier also believes that some rules are neither constitutive nor regulative. To 
accommodate this, Meier adds a new category of rules that he names "auxiliary 
rules."3 Although this group has some overlap with Searle's description of regula-
tive rules, Meier does not make that connection. Instead he says that this group of 
rules, such as the ones that spelled out Suarez's disqualification from the current 
and following game after his handball, "specifies and regulates eligibility, admis-
sion, training and other pre-contest requirements," and "is of a different color or 
nature entirely than constitutive rules and, as such, has nothing whatsoever to do 
with the essence of sport" (6: pp. 70-71). Meier seems to say that auxiliary rules, 
while important, are not necessary for the game to occur. 
Morgan, in the next article on game rules, views constitutive rules as more 
central and prominent than any other author since Suits. He declares that con-
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Categorical Shortcomings 201 
stitutive rules are those "upon which the very existence of the game is logically 
dependent," and they are "to be distinguished from another kind (regulative rules) 
which regulates antecedently or independently existing forms of behavior, and to 
which specific penalties are attached" (7: p. 51). This sounds Searlean, but Morgan 
adds caveats that make his interpretation different. He says that "regulative rules 
presuppose the existence of constitutive rules (without which there would be noth-
ing to regulate), and so count as extensions of the latter" (7: p. 51). Clearly such 
a claim is not at all Searlean because Searle's regulative rules do not presuppose 
constituted forms of behavior. Instead Morgan seems to follow Suits and Meier in 
this line of thinking. 
More specifically, while Morgan and Searle believe that regulative rules regulate 
behavior, Morgan sees regulative rules more particularly as those which invoke 
penalties. In Searle's view, constitutive rules create or define new forms of behav-
ior and regulative rules regulate antecedently-existing conditions. Morgan, on the 
other hand, concludes that constitutive rules "regulate in a more primary sense, and 
without the pain of penalty" and regulative rules are penalty-invoking (7: p. 53).4 
Like some of his predecessors but unlike Morgan, Torres sees a great deal 
of overlap between constitutive and regulative rules. However, instead of naming 
regulative rules as extensions of constitutive rules, he discusses the reality of con-
stitutive/regulative hybrids. He states that "the dichotomy between constitutive 
and regulative rules is ... complicated by the fact that some regulative rules are 
not only nested in conventions but also have quasi-constitutive connotations and 
functions" ( 14: p. 82). 
Torres clearly understands that the distinction is imperfect, but like many other 
authors, he continues to use it.5 In order to clarify the relationship between different 
types of rules, he offers two amendments that more closely identify the functions 
of particular sets of rules. First, Torres amends Searle's definition of constitutive 
rules, instead describing them as lusory enactors-or those rules that enable new 
behaviors, such as the edict to use any part of one's body to score except the hands 
or arms. Second, he uses the term "lusory restorers" to explain what Morgan and 
others saw as regulative rules-rules that regulate constitutive behaviors, such as 
the referee awarding a penalty kick to Ghana and a red card to Suarez in an attempt 
to restore fairness in the game (14: p. 83). 
Lastly, Kretchmar realized the degree to which scholars deviated from Searle's 
original positions and attempted to clarify Searle's constitutive/regulative distinc-
tion by redirecting our attention back to Searle's own words. He upholds Searle's 
description of constitutive rules as those that "create or define new forms of 
behavior," despite modification attempts by many of the aforementioned authors. 
More importantly, he clarifies Searle's position on regulative rules, stating that "for 
Searle, then, regulative rules do not specify penalties. (A subset of constitutive rules 
... do that.) Rather, regulative rules operate outside of and, at least potentially, 
prior to and during the formation of conventions" (3: p. 163). Thus, Kretchmar 
understands that Searle and some of the scholars mentioned are pointing to two 
different distinctions when they employ the constitutive-regulative terminology. 
While his viewpoint varies greatly from the others, Kretchmar continues to use the 
constitutive/regulative paradigm to explain the nature of game rules. 
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202 Carlson and Gleaves 
Analysis of the Categorical Method 
So what lessons can we draw from the preceding literature review? First, and most 
importantly, the categories provided by this literature have not produced a definitive 
paradigm to understand game rules in general or Suarez's actions in particular. Did 
Suarez violate one of Searle's constitutive rules? It would initially seem so since not 
using one's hands defines the sport. Yet the categorical paradigm does not account 
for differences within the constitutive category. Surely Suarez's handball occurred 
in a context that included important differences from ordinary or incidental hand-
ball penalties, yet this paradigm is unable to handle the intracategory variability. 
At the same time, Suarez's violation, even though it directly affected the outcome 
of the game, may concurrently fit into seemingly more peripheral categories such 
as Suits' subset that is an extension of constitutive rules, Meier's regulative rules, 
or Torres' lusory restorers. With this messy experiential reality of what seem to 
be fairly clean and distinct categories, the current paradigm provides little help in 
analyzing the place of game adjudication, rule following, rule breaking, and the 
playing of games. 
Additional lessons also emerge that provide reason to question the usefulness 
of the categorical distinction. Many differing conceptions of Searle's distinction 
between constitutive and regulative rules exist. Given such discrepancies, scholars 
cannot assume one standard definition exists for constitutive and regulative rules. 
While Kretchmar's clarification of Searle's original distinction between constitu-
tive and regulative rules reinforces Searle's initial point, it also serves to highlight 
the various directions taken by different scholars. For example, Suits describes 
constitutive rules (and a corresponding unnamed subset) in his own way without 
explicitly referencing regulative rules. D' Agostino believes that only two distinct 
and dichotomized categories of rules (constitutive and regulative) make games 
too formalistic. Instead he offers three categories of game behaviors (permissible, 
impermissible but acceptable, and unacceptable) that are governed by social conven-
tions (and a certified official, of course). Reddiford also takes little interest in the 
constitutive-regulative distinction, and he redefines constitutive rules to promote 
pregame behaviors (a grouping that Searle would have called regulative). Meier 
dismisses the possibility of dichotomizing between constitutive and regulative rules 
and takes a Suitsean turn to say that regulative rules are extensions of constitutive 
rules while also adding a new category (auxiliary rules). Morgan believes that 
constitutive rules are the central features of games while regulative rules differ in 
that they invoke penalties. Torres then asserts a need for distinguishing between 
lusory enablers and lusory restorers but describes a complex relationship in which 
some regulative rules serve constitutive functions or purposes. Although these 
scholars all use the constitutive/regulative terminology, it is obvious that each of 
them interprets or builds on Searle's distinction differently. 
These differing accounts have resulted in a metaphysical stalemate with each 
new author going in a seemingly different direction from the others. Although 
Kretchmar attempted to break this logjam by revisiting Searle's original definitions 
of constitutive and regulative rules, not all scholars have grabbed onto his "revis-
ited" positions. Instead, some scholars continue to use a version of the constitutive 
(prescriptions) vs. regulative (proscriptions) distinction that D' Agostino, Meier, 
Morgan, and Torres discussed. Others more haphazardly select aspects from vari-
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Categorical Shortcomings 203 
ous stipulated definitions in ways that lead to conceptual confusion. The ultimate 
result, then, is that when instances like Suarez's handball arise, philosophers using 
the constitutive/regulative paradigm struggle to explain the connection between 
games and their rules. 
We are left, then, with various frameworks for understanding constitutive and 
regulative categories of rules but no real way to apply the framework to messy, 
real-world situations. Perhaps the problem is not a need to more accurately define 
the categories, as past scholars have attempted. Rather, there is a more fundamen-
tal issue derailing this mode of inquiry. While the categorical distinction showed 
some promise, what the existing scholarship has revealed is that game rules do not 
fit neatly into categories. The quest for a set of operationally complete categories 
ultimately squeezes rules into artificial categories that fall frustratingly short of 
helping us understand complex game issues like that of Suarez. The aforementioned 
philosophers have defined (and redefined) categories in attempts to match all of 
our game rules. However, based on the existing pattern of scholarship, we would 
likely have to continue to redefine existing categories and add new categories to 
fully and accurately capture the breadth of game rules. 
Realistically, the complexity of game rules may make this an impossible task. 
Through the previous scholarly investigations it seems evident that rules operate 
more on a continuum, with some being more central to a game and others more 
peripheral. Some rules seem to wear multiple hats at the same time, perhaps con-
stituting the game and performing auxiliary functions. The method of creating 
categories and then plugging every rule into one of them appears incapable of ever 
doing the work that scholars are asking of it. 
Moreover, whenever scholars begin to distill the messy world into ordered 
patterns, they would do well to heed Wittgenstein's warning that whenever we use 
metaphysics to "grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the 
word ever actually used in this way ... ?" ( 15: p. 116). As philosophers know, relying 
too heavily on metaphysical categories or frameworks to explain the meaning or 
essence of different rules could easily lead to artificiality because the categories do 
not replicate the rules' actual use in practice. Thus it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to fit every game rule into a category as rules are often used differently at different 
times. Certainly scholars have devoted much effort to categorizing rules, having 
spent decades amending the constitutive and regulative categories as well as adding 
their own. But by focusing on building categories, we risk losing a description of 
game rules as they are practiced. 
This point is starkly illustrated by the Suarez handball. While the categorical 
distinction could potentially provide us with some sort of framework for understand-
ing his actions, we ultimately end up forcing aspects of his behavior into categories 
that may not fully or accurately capture the breadth or complexity of the situation. 
Scholars using this categorical framework have analyzed our game rules by creat-
ing categories and then separating rules into those categories-making everything 
a "this" or a "that." For instance, Searle would say that the rule forbidding Suarez 
to use his hands in soccer is constitutive (a "this"); Reddiford would argue instead 
that Suarez only violated an institutional rule that codified presoccer behavior (a 
redefined "this"); Morgan would assert that Suarez's penalty for a handball is a 
regulative rule (a "that"); Meier may argue that the rule preventing Suarez from 
using his hands is a regulative rule because it is simply an extension of a constitutive 
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204 Carlson and Gleaves 
rule (a redefined "that"); and D' Agostino might claim that Suarez's handling of 
the ball is an example of behavior in the category he calls "unacceptable" (neither 
a "this" nor a "that" but an example of an "other"). 
What is perhaps most frustrating is not the lack of agreement among scholars 
over the meaning of specific categories but that it is unclear how one would ever 
go about determining the categorization of Suarez's actions. His handball violation 
seems to fit into many categories yet at the same time no category seems capable 
of completely explaining the behavior. This scenario is far more troubling given 
the range of implications regarding adjudication that follow from the categories. 
If Suarez violated Searle's "constitutive rule," his actions, despite the punishment, 
seem far more excusable than if he engaged in D' Agostino's unacceptable behavior. 
Furthermore, the fact that Torres' lusory restorative skills (those connected to regu-
lative rules) exist to restart play means that we accept that rule-breaking happens 
in our games, but it does not necessarily mean that Suarez was right to engage in 
such behavior. Thus scholars and game officials wishing to understand Suarez's 
actions find that other scholars' writings on constitutive and regulative rules shed 
only incidental light on the situation with none providing a single concrete paradigm 
for judging his actions. 
The central shortcoming of the categorical approach is that it makes sharp 
distinctions that do not capture the sense of the rule in its context or actual usage. 
In other words, when using the categorical approach, philosophers strive for meta-
physical or descriptive tidiness that may not accurately portray our messy landscape 
of experiences. At best, this distinction serves as a rhetorical device designed to 
point out differences in certain rules but not as an ontological device that reveals 
the nature of rules. Perhaps, then, a different tactic is needed-a different way 
of describing game rules. As we shall argue, the descriptive change occurs when 
scholars shift from viewing these distinctions as metaphysical categories to treating 
the distinctions as a type of rough shorthand for describing common contextual 
settings of rules. In the case of game rules, we will argue that the latter may prove 
to be a more useful distinction. 
Understanding Categorical Distinctions 
as Contextual Descriptions 
In fairness, we acknowledge that not every author undertook the same task in 
their articles. While some of the scholars focused on particular categories of rules 
or on interpretations of Searle's constitutive/regulative distinction, many of them 
made larger arguments that illuminated game issues beyond Searle's rule distinc-
tion. However, the existing game rules literature has not addressed this flaw in the 
categorical method. Instead, the authors have imposed artificial categories of rules 
onto games-a method that shows neither how we use rules nor does it provide a 
context that might help us understand rules or adjudicate behavior in specific game 
situations-such as that of Suarez. The traditional approach of creating categories 
and then trying to fit the rules into them ignores the complex or multifunctional 
nature of rules. 
Nevertheless, some of the concepts for understanding rules in a different and 
more accurate way-as contextual descriptions-have been lurking in the exist-
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Categorical Shortcomings 205 
ing literature. The arguments of Reddiford, Morgan, Torres, and Kretchmar, for 
example, have encouraged us to ask, when trying to understand rules, why a rule 
is there (rule parentage), what purpose it serves (rule functionality), and how each 
rule helps us understand its game (rule importance). 
To understand contextual descriptions, one must consider rule parentage. Rule 
parentage helps us understand a rule's reason for being. These reasons often vary 
and help explain why rules function in many ways. For example, some rules come 
into being, as Reddiford noted, to protect or institutionalize our pregame behaviors. 
We loved the artificial problems presented by using only our feet before we ever 
had soccer, and so soccer institutionalized the rule that forbids using hands. Other 
rules have local parentage, such as soccer's relatively loose code of conduct that 
dates back to its beginnings as a British working class game. Still other rules can 
reflect physical or natural forces, such as local weather and geography (imagine if 
soccer stopped like baseball for rain delays). This diverse parentage is not unique 
to soccer, either. Many sports reflect similar pressures as their rules have come to 
be in a variety of ways. 
Our invocation to heed the parentage of rules when looking at the specific 
context of each rule's occurrence in games may seem contradictory.6 Admittedly, it 
would be very difficult for a game official to try to identify the parentage of each rule 
as its adherence or disobedience occurs during the course of the game. Undoubtedly 
referees, umpires, and other game officials have many more imminent issues with 
which they must deal. Yet rule parentage may still play a part in the adjudication 
of a game as it happens, even if it is not at the forefront of an official's in-game 
thinking. A referee of a youth developmental soccer league may adjudicate the 
game with an eye toward prioritizing the rules that most effectively promote skill 
development (Torres' lusory enablers). The referee of an elite professional league 
may have to develop (or obey) principles of rule adjudication that encourage the 
entertainment value of the game. Further, referees of adult recreation leagues may 
find themselves adhering most strictly to the rules that have come about to prevent 
injuries and physically violent action. 
As we delineate rule parentage, it becomes evident that rules have come 
about and are adhered to by players and officials in a variety of ways. However, 
the parentage of rules cannot tell the whole story. Rules often come to have differ-
ent functions once they are put into practice. For example, Torres' description of 
lusory enabling and lusory restorative rules shows that the same rule can serve the 
purpose of making sure that the game features the skills it was meant to feature (no 
hands-use the feet) while also serving the purpose of getting the game back on 
track after it has broken down (a free kick for a handball). Thus rule functionality 
also helps us understand some features of a rule's relationship to a game. 
Much like the multifunctional rule against handling a soccer ball, consider how 
uniform or jersey rules in soccer reflect this wide array of functions. At times, the 
jersey rule in soccer serves as a lusory enabling function as it allows teammates 
to more easily recognize each other during the speed of the game; it serves a cul-
tural function in that different games have slightly different jersey requirements 
depending on when, where, and in front of whom the game is being played; and it 
serves an auxiliary function in big-time soccer as the top leagues allow marketing 
on jerseys, but only so long as it conforms to the league7s liking. 
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Marketing nuances of the jersey rule in soccer are not crucial to the game itself. 
That is, they help us to understand the spectrum of rule importance-our third factor 
in contextual descriptions-because they matter very little to the game. Indeed, 
soccer can be played without any rules limiting or requiring marketing on jerseys. 
In fact, soccer can be played without jerseys. Some recreational soccer games occur 
with no clothing evidence of who belongs to which team, and others simply require 
one team to remove their shirts. Kretchmar and Morgan might argue, then, that the 
jersey rule is not central to the game of soccer, or at least not as central as other 
constitutive rules. It has some importance, especially when spectators are involved, 
but it is not necessary for soccer to come off. On the other hand, rules that feature 
soccer-specific skills, such as those encouraging use of the feet and prohibiting 
use of the hands, are very important to soccer-especially in and around the goal 
mouth. Clearly, rules vary between central and marginal importance, yet oftentimes 
the same rule-as is the case with jerseys--can span much of this spectrum. 
In practice, a person needs to know the specific context of the rule, for rules 
may be understood differently depending on the context. While some rules are hard 
and fast and should be adhered to at all times-such as soccer's handball rule-the 
context of the infraction helps to determine the consequences and implications in 
the particular game and how we value particular aspects of the game in general. 
When we take into account the parentage, function, and importance of a rule, we 
are developing an understanding of its context in the game. We propose, then, a 
method of contextual descriptions, whereby rules are understood via such things 
as their various parentage, functions, and importance among others. Contextual 
descriptions help situate individual rules and groups of rules into the broader struc-
ture of games and may help us better understand, for instance, Suarez's situation. 
Rather than seeking to identify the correct category for each rule, our approach 
investigates rules as they actually occur in practice. 
In this approach, to better understand rules, one basically identifies contex-
tual descriptions attached to specific situations. Understanding rules as contextual 
descriptions points out the need to know more about a game than its list of rules in 
order to play the game according to its rules. Simply teaching someone a game's 
constitutive and regulative rules would not necessarily tell a person how to play the 
game or even how to play it according to the rules. Playing by the rules is much more 
complex. One must know the context in which rules operate. Legal scholar Ronald 
Dworkin argues that the acquisition of principles often comes before and can be the 
foundation for the learning of rules (2). Our identification of parentage, function, 
and importance could potentially be among the principles that Dworkin would say 
provide a "gravitational force" for our understanding of game rules (2: p. 115). 
Examining the parentage, functionality, and importance of the handball rule in 
soccer might give gravitational force to how we understand this rule. The parentage 
of handling a ball is that this rule is what has set soccer apart from other ball games 
played on foot (rugby and American football, most specifically). Determining not 
to use the hands has molded the game of soccer to what it is today. Functionally, 
the handball rule may have some complexity. Handling can become part of a skill 
function much like Suits' claim not to trump a partner's ace (i.e., use the chest, 
head, or leg instead of the hand to control high balls-or, more strategically, use 
any means including handling to prevent a potential game-winning goal). Some 
may view the rule within the context of constitutive functionality that defines the 
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sporting test and should be adhered to, but when examining the foul from a fair-
ness standpoint, others may describe the lusory restorative function of handling 
as a give-and-take that can be done if one understands the penal consequences. 
Simon has made headway in this regard by determining a difference between prices 
and sanctions for breaking a rule ( 12). Prices are penalties for illegal behavior 
that often happens incidentally or strategically. Sanctions, however, are penalties 
for illegal behavior that we never want to occur in games. While some might say 
that Suarez's action was morally defensible because he made a strategic decision 
to pay the price for handling the ball, others might say that soccer gamewrights 
developed a sanction (penalty kick and disqualification) for his behavior because 
they disapprove of it and never want it to happen. 
Looking at a rule's importance might help us sift through the complex func-
tionality of the rule. Clearly, the rule outlawing handling the ball is of central 
importance to soccer. While we may not be able to give a full and robust continuum 
of most to least important rules, we seem to intuitively understand where a rule 
may generally stand. Handballs are important (especially at the end of close games 
when they affect the outcome of the games). On the other hand, rules governing 
lusory restorative skills, Torres tells us, are not as central to the game of soccer. 
Therefore we want to have victory in soccer determined by those who show greater 
lusory enabling skill while abiding by the most central rules, rather than allowing 
egregious rule breaking to taint the game enough that it must be determined by 
more marginal rules that govern lusory restorative skills. 
Such a view of rules is not incompatible with Russell's take on Dworkin, integ-
rity, and adjudication of rules in sport. Russell, following Dworkin, argues that a 
principle of integrity can help us interpret rules when their application is unclear. 
The principle of integrity essentially holds that rule changes or rule interpretations 
must be based on the relevant principles of a practice community. It seems as though 
rule parentage, functionality, and importance are among the relevant contextual 
characteristics that help us to uphold or determine the integrity of a practice com-
munity. Any new interpretation, change or improvement to the rules must fit within 
the practice's assumed principles. Thus rules are understood as having continuity 
and officials, gamewrights, or other rule adjudicators ought to interpret rules such 
that they maintain integrity with past practices. 
Russell's adaptation of Dworkin provides officials with a useful framework 
for adjudicating tough decisions such as the Suarez case. However, Russell's 
account of integrity does not explain the nature of game rules. Instead, Russell 
provides an account of how game rules might be applied to game situations. Yet 
for our purposes, and even the purposes of those scholars who sought categori-
cal distinctions, an understanding of the nature of game rules can better inform 
the adjudication of issues that relate to values or characteristics central to the 
game. Nonetheless, Russell's principle of integrity indicates the practical value 
of understanding contextual descriptions of rules such as parentage, function, and 
importance that can act as indicators or signposts for philosophers, gamewrights, 
and officials seeking to interpret game rules. For example, understanding a rule's 
parentage, functionality, and importance can help a referee delineate the appropriate 
response or interpretation of a particular behavior or rule violation. It can also help 
sporting organizations in their role as gamewrights when they are determining if a 
rule needs to be rewritten to avoid certain kinds of behavior. We argue, accordingly, 
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that an official will be in a better position to adjudicate soccer and a gamewright 
will be in a better position to determine a rule change, for example, if the relevant 
rules and principles are contextualized with an understanding of the parentage, 
functionality, and importance of rules. 
The existing categorical method does not account for the context of rules. Schol-
ars who made arguments based on Searlean, Kantian, and/or their own categories 
believed that we could look at a game and determine the categorical designation 
of its rules. Yet without context, one could not differentiate the varying functions 
of the jersey rule or Suarez's situation, for instance. Thus rule context provides 
necessary information as we interpret rules and adjudicate them within games. 
A contextual description offers a more accurate-if also messier-understand-
ing of games and their rules. Contextual descriptions identify the ways in which 
rules relate to the various parentage, functionality, and importance within games. 
These descriptions often help remind us of the diverse ways that rules have come 
to operate within games; for Suarez's action would not have been nearly as memo-
rable if it had happened in the opening minutes of an international friendly game. 
Scholars can also use these contextual descriptions to elucidate how a single rule 
in a game performs multiple functions. Since in practice a single rule can often 
function multiple ways, (i.e., both constitutively and regulatively, or by any other 
term used by previous scholars who wrote about game rules), using descriptions 
rather than categories provides a series of signposts that assemble a more complete 
and accurate, albeit less tidy, articulation of rules in games. 
This brings us around to a point of agreement with past literature. Although 
we reject the attempts of many scholars of game rules to label categories of rules, 
we believe that what they in fact frequently identified are good descriptions of 
functionality. This shift is both subtle and seismic. It rejects the methodology of 
Searle et al. as inevitably doomed to failure. At the same time, it resurrects this 
body of work on game rules, recognizing that such terms work as descriptors that 
articulate different contexts of rules or the operation that rules perform in games. 
Turning the various separate categories of rules into signpost-like contextual 
descriptions, they provide useful shorthand for describing game rules as we expe-
rience them. In the case of Suarez, these signposts point us toward various areas 
for consideration. For example, did Suarez unethically exploit the weakness of the 
regulative or lusory restorative function in what we consider to be among the most 
hallowed constitutive behaviors? Should FIFA work to shore up this loophole or 
acknowledge that such gamesmanship of the rules is acceptable? As philosophers 
come to better understand the context of various signposts, the signposts can act 
as reminders for providing clarity on the function of the rule in the game operation 
which in turn shows the role of rules in games. Once this type of context has been 
identified, then referees may have a more robust understanding of how game rules 
and principles should be enforced. 
Thus the field of sport philosophy should not abandon using terms such as 
"constitutive" and "regulative" or even "lusory restorer" and "auxiliary" despite 
their various stipulations. These terms provide useful nets for catching the sense 
of rules as they occur. But they are only nets that catch specific senses rather than 
labels for classes of rules. We would be wrong to conclude that a hard and fast set 
of auxiliary rules existed. Indeed, Suarez's case illustrates just how problematic 
such an assumption proves to be. Instead, we must shift how we view the work 
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that these terms are doing. Constitutive and regulative do not label classes of rules 
or get at the essence of rules as some scholars had hoped. Instead, they provide 
helpful reminders of the contexts by which we most fully understand particular 
rules-signposts to guide us in studying rules, nets for catching certain senses of 
rules. While not metaphysically tidy, this conception of rules does provide a more 
accurate and hopefully more useful paradigm for considering game rules. 
Conclusion 
So what lessons can scholars draw from the use of constitutive and regulative rules 
to evaluate Suarez's actions?These terms can provide a launch pad as descriptors to 
begin analysis of specific incidents in games, but we need to be careful if we treat 
them as distinct, rigid categories that name ontological or metaphysical aspects 
of rules. In that sense, the existing literature can provide some benefit, but as it 
currently stands, too much conceptual confusion still exists and in many cases the 
distinction between rules blurs to the point that categories do not appear useful for 
capturing the relationship between rules and games-a relationship that is central 
to those who adjudicate sporting events. Perhaps by forgoing a pursuit of meta-
physically neat categories in favor of simple descriptions of the contexts of rules, 
scholars and practitioners alike may begin to better understand this relationship. 
To reach this conclusion, we first demonstrated inconsistent use of language 
and terminology regarding the categories of rules. We showed that at this point in 
time, little consensus exists among the philosophers using these terms and many 
stipulate different definitions for the same words or create new terms to fit their 
needs. Second, we argued that the categorical method has fundamental flaws in that 
rules operate in a far messier world. Inevitably this messiness dooms any account 
of categories for rules since such categories cannot mirror the complex and over-
lapping nature of the reality of game rules. This flaw explains why philosophers 
never could agree on the definitions of categories since the terms always failed to 
accurately describe all rules in all situations. The problem was not finding the right 
categories, but that no set of categories could ever do the work philosophers were 
demanding of it. While some benefit has emerged from this rule literature, it is 
doubtful that such a categorical approach to game rules could ever single-handedly 
help scholars better interpret Suarez's handball and other complex cases. 
Instead, we have suggested a better way to study rules: through contextual 
descriptions. Contextual descriptions are ways in which philosophers examine 
games to see how a rule operates during the game. In other words, we ought to 
describe rules based on the way that officials, players, and coaches are using rules 
within specific contexts. While the majority of the categories used by followers of 
Searle provide good functional descriptions as well, they are not the only descrip-
tions that exist. Practicing contextual descriptions provides sport philosophers with 
many advantages. Transforming many of the categories of previously mentioned 
sport philosophers such as Searle, Suits, D' Agostino, Reddiford, Meier, Morgan, 
Torres and Kretchmar into descriptions of the contexts of rules can better illustrate 
game rules, thus providing a better understanding of the operation of rules. When 
we applied such functional descriptions to Suarez's example, we found that the 
categories scholars had previously defined provided valuable shorthand for isolating 
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essential philosophical questions. Moreover, with such a pluralistic understand-
ing of game rules, the conceptual disagreement among sport philosophers over 
the operation of rules within games dissolves, leaving in its place a more useful 
paradigm for understanding complex issues in sport. 
Notes 
I. Of the authors we review in the following pages, D' Agostino (1), Reddiford (8), Meier 
(6), Morgan (7), Torres (14), and Kretchmar (3) explicitly reference Searle's work and use his 
terminology as a basis for their ideas (D' Agostino's reference is in an endnote). Suits (13), the 
only other author whose work we review, makes no reference to Searle in his text or footnotes. 
It should be added, though, that Suits has no bibliography and makes only a few footnotes in his 
entire book. 
2. We will refer to the "Searlean" paradigm throughout the paper as a term that expresses both 
a linguistic and a conceptual framework. The Searlean paradigm expresses a framework that uti-
lizes the terms "constitutive" and "regulative" to explain rules, and it does so from a categorical 
viewpoint. 
3. Meier gives three groups of examples of auxiliary rules. They are: rules of safety; rules 
regarding empirical characteristics such as sex, weight, or age; and arbitrary restrictions on 
participation. 
4. While, with this contrast from Searle's constitutive/regulative distinction, it might be said 
that Morgan is using the terms to mean something entirely different, he is still using the same 
terms as Searle and even references the latter by saying, "This, I take it, is the gist of Searle's 
claim that the 'constitutive rules constitute (and also regulate) an activity the existence of which 
is logically dependent on the rules"' (7):* p. 53). 
5. On this topic, Torres argues that "even with these practical complications [of constitutive-
regulative overlap], the constitutive-regulative distinction is still useful in describing distinct 
legislative needs related to game playing" ( 14. Torres, C. R. "What Counts as Part of a Game? A 
Look at Skills." Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, XXVII 2000, 81-92. 
6. We would like to thank a reviewer for bringing this issue to our attention. 
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